RAND's research on terrorism formally began in 1972. Two bloody terrorist incidents that year-the Japanese Red Army attack on passengers at the Lod Airport in Israel and the seizure of Israeli athletes by Black September terrorists at the Olympics in Munich-signaled dramatically to the world that a new mode of warfare had begun. Reacting to this new threat, then President Nixon created the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, a high level group to coordinate all U.S. counterterrorist efforts. The committee in turn commissioned RAND to examine the phenomenon and how it might affect American security interests. Terrorism was not a new concern for the government, at least in its particular forms-the hijacking of airliners, the kidnapping of diplomats, protest bombings. However, as is so often the case, dramatic events focused interest and mobilized resources. Nor was this entirely new territory for RAND, which previously had studied the use of terrorism in revolutionary and guerrilla warfare, already had identified the new phenomenon of urban guerrilla warfare and its inherent tendency toward the employment of terrorist tactics, and had examined the problem of airline hijackings and assassinations. Having been present at the initiation of RAND's research on terrorism, and now 27 years later being called upon to review this latest RAND volume, Countering the New Terrorism, by Ian Lesser and his colleagues, provides me an opportunity for review and reflection, as well as for pointing out some of the unanticipated consequences of our endeavor.